The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine reports that Russian arms exports have collapsed sharply since the start of the full-scale war. According to the Jamestown Foundation, export volumes fell from $12.5 billion in 2021 to $8 billion in 2022, $3 billion in 2023, and just $1 billion in 2024. SIPRI estimates that Russia’s share of the global arms market has dropped from 21% to 7.8%. The geography of deliveries has shrunk from 47 countries (2018–2022) to 33 in 2024, mostly in Asia and Oceania. Major traditional buyers — India, China, and Kazakhstan — are reducing their purchases.
Indian refineries have cut imports of Russian oil to their lowest level in three years due to U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, which previously supplied roughly half of the volumes. According to Reuters, in December India will receive only 600,000–650,000 barrels per day — three times less than in November (1.87 million barrels). Compared to September and October, when deliveries were around 1.65 million barrels per day, supplies have collapsed by roughly 60%.
Russia’s industrial sector has exhausted the potential for cheap software import substitution and now finds itself in a paradoxical situation: it needs complex, innovative products to replace failing systems, but instead of developing new solutions, companies are buying ready-made alternatives due to resource shortages and limited access to advanced technologies. Although the share of Russian software in expenditures has increased from 19–29% to 35%, and foreign software has fallen from 47% to 12%, spending on truly innovative development is no longer growing — the industry is purchasing what already exists on the market instead of investing in future solutions.
