Strategic Minerals Moscow Cannot Replace Before 2035 — ESCU Research

25 July 2026
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Strategic Minerals Moscow Cannot Replace Before 2035 — ESCU Research

Despite possessing the world’s largest mineral reserves, Russia lacks complete production chains for a range of strategic minerals needed to sustain its military-industrial complex (MIC), according to a new report by the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU).

Since 2022, the Kremlin has announced plans to increase the extraction of scarce raw materials. However, ESCU estimates that most of these projects will not reach industrial-scale output before 2035, creating a window of opportunity for external economic pressure.

Chinese-origin products accounted for more than 97% of Russia’s tungsten imports by value and more than 99% by volume during the period analysed, from April 2024 to March 2025. The metal is used in armour-piercing ammunition, UAV warheads, aircraft and missile systems. Russia also imported $1.04 billion worth of alumina, $4.08 million worth of tantalum and $64.1 million worth of niobium products from China.

Ferroniobium also reached Russia directly from Brazil: 1,033 tonnes worth $33.17 million, accounting for about 30% of imports. Canada supplied a further 388.47 tonnes worth $12.87 million, or 11.7% of imports. Despite EU sanctions, another 82 tonnes of Dutch-origin ferroniobium worth $2.55 million reached Russia via Türkiye, while 40 tonnes of Brazilian- and Canadian-origin material worth $1.22 million were shipped from Germany. Russia uses ferroniobium in high-strength and heat-resistant steels required to manufacture missile bodies, engines and armoured vehicles.

The Kremlin also received 960,350 tonnes of Irish-origin alumina worth $567.68 million and accounting for 17% of imports. Alumina is used to produce aluminium, which is in turn required for military aircraft and missiles, including the Kh-101, Kalibr and Iskander.

Russia also depends on supplies from Kazakhstan, which accounted for nearly 69% of tantalum imports, worth $9.28 million, and 76.4% of beryllium-product imports, worth $11.03 million. ESCU analysts identified supplies of these materials to manufacturers of the Iskander-M, Kinzhal, Pantsir-S and Kh-59 systems.

Imports from Uzbekistan are also critical to aircraft and missile-engine production: 3.95 tonnes of rhenium feedstock worth $2.29 million, representing 94.4% of supplies. Armenia, meanwhile, supplied 2,058 tonnes of molybdenum products worth $65.25 million, accounting for 42% of imports. Almost the entire volume consisted of ferromolybdenum, which is used in specialty steels for the aviation, missile and defence industries.

“Cutting off supplies of strategic minerals will inevitably lead to weapons shortages in Russia and strengthen the case for a ceasefire. But achieving this will require decisive economic restrictions targeting the entire supply ecosystem — from raw materials to traders, exporters and logistics hubs,” said Olena Yurchenko, Director of Analytics, Research, and Investigations at the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU).

This material was prepared with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The material reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Strategic Minerals Moscow Cannot Replace Before 2035 — ESCU Research
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